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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 59 JANUARY 2011 NUMBER 1 
Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector 
Collective Bargaining Agreements and the 
Contract Clause 
STEPHEN F. BEFORT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Public sector budgets in the United States have 
experienced a roller coaster ride during the past three 
decades. Rapidly changing economic conditions have 
produced alternating periods of feast and famine for state 
and local governmental units. With personnel costs typically 
constituting over half of all expenditures,1 public employers 
increasingly have focused on reducing the cost of 
employment as a means of coping with periods of fiscal 
crisis.  
In the highly unionized public sector,2 managerial 
attempts to rein in personnel costs have put stress on the 
collective bargaining process. Not surprisingly, many public 
employers adopted aggressive positions at the bargaining 
table as a means of coping with fiscal strains.3 Sometimes, 
however, governmental entities took more drastic measures   
† Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Valerie Darling, Luke Garrett, 
Krista Hatcher, and Nina Englander for their assistance in the preparation of 
this Article. 
 1. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 
1993) (stating that personnel costs amounted to 82.5% of the Baltimore Public 
School budget); Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: 
Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 266 (1987) (“Labor costs may be 
[70%] of a city’s budget.”). 
 2. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Donald Slesnick II & Jennifer Poltrock, Public Sector Bargaining in 
the Mid­90s (The 1980s Were Challenging, But This is Ridiculous)—A Union 
Perspective, 25 J. L. & EDUC. 661, 662­64 (1996). 
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such as attempting to modify existing contractual 
agreements on a unilateral basis.4 In the private sector, 
such unilateral action would be deemed both a breach of 
contract remediable in arbitration and an unfair labor 
practice subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”). Although similar limitations 
also exist in most public sector jurisdictions, governmental 
bodies generally have more leeway to act on a unilateral 
basis than do their private sector counterparts.5 
This Article focuses on one source of governmental 
unilateral action—the law­making function. This occurs 
when a governmental entity with law­making authority, 
such as a state legislature, enacts a statute or ordinance 
that trumps the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
If that entity is not a statutory “employer” who is a 
signatory party to the agreement, the only limitation on the 
entity’s lawmaking authority is the contract clause of the 
United States Constitution.6 Although the contract clause 
literally proscribes any impairment of contract, the United 
States Supreme Court has long recognized that a state may 
modify a contract by legislation that is “reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.”7 This 
justification is more problematic, however, when a 
legislative body impairs one of its own contracts with the 
effect of relieving its own financial obligations.  
This Article analyzes those judicial decisions that have 
confronted the rub between public sector collective 
bargaining agreements and a governmental body’s law­
making function. A majority of decisions have appropriately 
applied Supreme Court precedent to restrict the scope of 
such legislative modifications to instances where they are 
reasonable and necessary. A minority of decisions, however, 
have deferred to the legislative body in spite of that entity’s 
self­interest. One objective of this Article is to determine 
whether this latter group of decisions inappropriately 
  
 4. See id. at 667. 
 5. See Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and 
Unilateral Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1274 (1985) [hereinafter Befort, 
Public Sector Bargaining]. 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No [s]tate shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw 
impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts . . . .”). 
 7. U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).  
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affords second­class status to public sector employees and 
their collective agreements.  
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the 
growth of public sector unionism and some of the conceptual 
theories that initially delayed this growth. Part II reviews 
the cyclical budgetary problems that have beset the public 
sector over the past thirty years. Part III then compares and 
contrasts unilateral change rules in the private and public 
sectors. In Part IV, the Article examines the contract clause 
jurisprudence that has emerged with respect to public 
sector collective bargaining agreements through these 
successive waves of fiscal crisis. Finally, in Part V, the 
Article critiques this jurisprudence and suggests a 
framework for the resolution of future disputes.   
I.  THE BELATED GROWTH OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONISM  
Although public sector unions first emerged in the 
1800s,8 their numbers lagged far behind that of private 
sector unions through the 1950s.9 When Congress enacted 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in 1935, 
governmental employers were excluded from the scope of 
coverage.10 While this exclusion reflected concerns about 
federalism and the Tenth Amendment generally,11 it also 
reflected the then­pervasive belief that public employment 
and union membership were inherently incompatible. In 
1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed the 
prevailing sentiment of the period in a letter to the 
President of the National Federation of Federal Employees 
stating:  
All [g]overnment employees should realize that the process of 
collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be 
transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and 
  
 8. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 4­5 (2004).  
 9. See Richard B. Freeman, Through Public Sector Eyes: Employee Attitudes 
Toward Public Sector Labor Relations in the U.S., in PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 59, 59 (Dale Belman et al. eds., 1996). 
 10. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
 11. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union Is”: 
How State Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector 
Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981, 1025­27 (2000).  
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insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel 
management. The very nature and purposes of [g]overnment 
make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or 
to bind the employer in mutual discussions with [g]overnment 
employe [sic] organizations. The employer is the whole people, 
who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in 
Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employes [sic] 
alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, 
by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel 
matters.12  
The courts tended to share this unfavorable view of public 
sector unionism, and decisions upholding restrictions on the 
right of public employees to join unions were commonplace 
through the early 1960s.13  
During this period, two conceptual distinctions were 
thought to preclude the possibility of transplanting private 
sector policies and procedures to the public sector.14 First, 
emanating from the old English common law notion that the 
“king can do no wrong,” the sovereignty doctrine taught that 
the state, as the supreme repository of all legal and political 
authority, could not be compelled to accept an obligation 
against its will.15 The doctrine also implied that public 
  
 12. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, 
President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937), reprinted in CHARLES S. 
RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW 436­37 (1946). 
 13. See, e.g., Perez v. Board of Police Comm’rs, 178 P.2d 537, 545 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1947); Mugford v. Mayor of Balt., 44 A.2d 745, 747 (Md. 1945); Local 
201, AFSCME v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197, 197 (Mich. 1963); City of 
Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Mo. 1947); Hagerman v. City of 
Dayton, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (Ohio 1947). 
 14. See generally HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS 
AND THE CITIES 7­32 (1971); William L. Corbett, Determining the Scope of Public 
Sector Collective Bargaining: A New Look Via a Balancing Formula, 40 MONT. 
L. REV. 231, 253­57 (1979); William J. Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for 
Bargaining in Local Government Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. REV. 179, 184­91 
(1970); Sylvester Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public­Sector Bargaining, 
10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 165 (1974). But see Clyde W. Summers, Public 
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1156­57 (1974) 
(“[I]t does not follow from the proposition that collective bargaining in the public 
and private sectors is different . . . that practices in the private sector cannot be 
transplanted to the public sector.”). 
 15. KURT L. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT 14­20 (1967); JOAN WEITZMAN, THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING IN PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT 7­12 (1975). 
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employees, as servants of the sovereign, owed a duty of 
“extra loyalty” to the state.16 A related barrier to the 
development of public sector collective bargaining was the 
delegation doctrine, which prohibits government from 
delegating to private parties authority concerning matters 
properly within its legislative discretion.17 Collective 
negotiation with a public sector union ran afoul of this 
doctrine because it was viewed as an improper delegation, 
or abdication, of governmental authority to labor unions.18  
Sometime around 1960, the respective fortunes of 
unions in the private and public sectors began to reverse. 
Private sector union density began a long decline from its 
peak of around 40%, while public sector union density began 
to climb from its trough of around 5%.19 Public sector 
unionism’s growth spurt coincided with an extraordinary 
rise in public sector budgets.20 Fueled by a strong economy 
and President Johnson’s War on Poverty, state and local 
government expenditures increased from 8.4% of gross 
national product in 1957 to 13.2% in 1977.21 The public 
  
 16. See Harry T. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public 
Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357, 360­61 (1972); Allan Weisenfeld, Public 
Employees—First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J. 685, 686­87 (1965). 
 17. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.12 (2d ed. 
1978). 
 18. See Slater, supra note 11, at 996, 1000­04.  
 19. See Freeman, supra note 9, at 59. As has been well­documented, union 
membership in the United States peaked at 34.5% of the workforce in 1954 and 
since has experienced a long and continuous decline. See Stephen F. Befort, 
Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and 
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 361­62 (2002); Michael Goldfield, The 
Decline of Organized Labor in the United States 10 tbl.1 (1987). 
 20. The coincidental growth of government employment and public sector 
unionism is described in a number of articles. See, e.g., Patricia N. Blair, State 
Legislative Control Over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the 
Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 5­7 (1973); Joan P. Weitzman, The Effect of Economic Restraints on 
Public­Sector Collective Bargaining: The Lessons of New York City, 2 EMP. REL. 
L.J. 286, 288 (1977). 
 21. RESEARCH & POL’Y COMM. OF THE COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., IMPROVING 
MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC WORK FORCE: THE CHALLENGE TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 29 (1978). 
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sector labor force followed suit, almost doubling in size 
between 1960 and 1980.22  
Public sector unionization rates increased even more 
dramatically. In 1956, only 915,000 federal, state, and local 
employees were union members.23 By 1980, the number of 
state and local employees that belonged to employee 
organizations had increased more than five­fold to 5,030,564 
employees.24 Meanwhile, a majority of states adopted 
legislation guaranteeing the collective bargaining rights of 
some or all occupational groups.25  
Today, union density rates in the private and public 
sectors are virtually the inverse of what they were in 1960. 
On a national level, union members accounted for 12.4% of 
employed wage and salary workers in 2008.26 But, public 
sector employees were over four times more likely to be 
members of a union (40.7%) than were employees in private 
industry (8.4%).27 
As government’s role in society expanded, the 
overarching concept of absolute governmental supremacy 
began to wane.28 Government began to assume more 
ordinary legal responsibilities in its relationship with the 
public, and the paternalistic “extra loyalty” doctrine 
  
 22. The public sector labor force increased from 8,353,000 in 1960 to 
16,241,000 in 1980. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 31 EMP. 
& EARNINGS 1, 45 tbl.B­1 (Feb. 1984). 
 23. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
STATISTICS 1975, BULL. 1865, 382 tbl.155 (1975). 
 24. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR­MGMT. SERVS. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL STUDIES 
NO. 102, LABOR­MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
1980, 1 tbl.B (1981). 
 25. By 1977, thirty­three states had enacted collective bargaining legislation 
that covered some or all public sector occupational groups. B. V. H. Schneider, 
Public­Sector Labor Legislation—An Evolutionary Analysis, in PUBLIC­SECTOR 
BARGAINING 191, 192 (Benjamin Aaron et al. eds., 1979). 
 26. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Economic News Release, 
Union Membership (Annual) News Release, tbl.1, http://www.bls.gov/news. 
release/union2.htm (last modified Jan. 22, 2010). 
 27. Id. at tbl. 3.  
 28. See WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 8­12; WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 
14, at 36­41. 
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declined in importance.29 This trend is perhaps best 
illustrated by the widespread abrogation of sovereign 
immunity with respect to tort claims.30   
The enactment of comprehensive bargaining laws and 
the decline of the sovereignty doctrine did not, however, 
result in a wholesale transplant of the private sector labor 
relations model to the public sector. Courts and 
commentators, instead, formulated a new set of theoretical 
constraints that, although no longer foreclosing public 
sector bargaining in its entirety, purportedly require a more 
limited scope of bargaining and a ban on the right to 
strike.31 
These modern constraints on the bargaining obligation 
are a result of both the structural complexity of government 
and the demands of the democratic political process.32 The 
structural obstacles in the public sector stem from the 
coexistence of public employee bargaining legislation with a 
large body of constitutional and statutory provisions that 
bear on the employment relationship and that, for the most 
part, predate the advent of public sector bargaining.33 The 
political limitations result from the fear that adopting 
private sector notions regarding the scope of bargaining and 
contract enforcement might skew the democratic process by 
giving public sector unions an inordinate degree of power in 
comparison with other interest groups.34  
Both of these concerns are relevant to the law­making 
function of state and local legislative bodies that is the 
subject of this Article. Yet, as I have written elsewhere, “the 
  
 29. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 359­61. 
 30. See id. at 360. 
 31. See, e.g., Befort, Public Sector Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1234­35. 
 32. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 361­64; William F. Kay, The Need for 
Limitation Upon the Scope of Negotiations in Public Education, II, 2 J.L. & 
EDUC. 155, 155 (1973).  
 33. See Arnold Weber, Prospects for the Future, Introduction to LABOR 
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 3, 5 (Andria S. Knapp ed. 1977) (“[P]ublic 
sector unionism and bargaining were superimposed on a well­developed, explicit 
and, indeed, almost ossified alternate personnel system which went under the 
folkloric term, civil service.”). 
 34. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 14, at 7­32; see also Clyde 
Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 
U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 265 (1987). 
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brief history of public sector labor relations is largely a story 
of how these theoretical distinctions have become obsolete 
as labor relations in the public sector increasingly has taken 
on the attributes of private sector labor relations.”35 One of 
the goals of this Article is to examine the extent to which 
the judiciary’s treatment of the law­making function and 
the contract clause replicates labor relations in the private 
sector or continues the conceptual second­class status of 
public sector labor relations.   
II.  CYCLES OF FISCAL CRISIS  
State governments currently are “in the worst fiscal 
shape since the Depression.”36 Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s “Great California Garage Sale”37 
symbolizes the desperate economic conditions faced by the 
forty­eight states that confronted a deficit in 2009.38 During 
its two­day sale, California sold nearly 600 state­owned 
vehicles, office furniture, computers, electronics, jewelry, 
pianos, a surfboard, a food saver, and an Xbox 360 gaming 
system.39 Despite these efforts, the state was forced to issue 
IOUs worth $1.5 billion, in what some labeled a “shameful 
chapter in the state’s history.”40 A year later, the City of 
Maywood, California, responded to the continuing economic 
downturn by laying off all 100 employees and outsourcing 
all municipal services.41 Economic conditions deteriorated 
dramatically for state and local governments during 2009,42 
continued in 2010,43 and are expected to worsen in 2011.44  
  
 35. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1231­32. 
 36. Bob Herbert, Invitation to Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at A19. 
 37. Judy Lin, California Hopes Garage Sale Will Put Funds into State Coffer, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2009, at A9.  
 38. See State Budgets in Crisis: Happy New Year, ECONOMIST, July 4, 2009, at 
27. 
 39. Lin, supra note 37, at A9.  
 40. Matthew Yi, State Budget Fallout: Era of IOUs is Ending, Controller 
Proclaims, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 14, 2009, at D1, D7 (quoting California state 
Controller John Chiang). 
 41. See Municipal Finances: There Goes Everybody, ECONOMIST, July 10, 
2010, at 32.  
 42. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 
THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at vii­ix (June 2009) [hereinafter FISCAL SURVEY 
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While the severity of the 2009­10 budget crisis is 
relatively unique, the existence of public sector budget 
crises are not. The most recent crisis constitutes the fourth 
such period in the last thirty years. In 1982, 1991, 2003­04, 
and now in 2009­10, states and local government units faced 
similar budget problems.45 During the first era in the early 
1980s, more than half of the country’s 275 biggest cities 
experienced budget problems.46 During the second era in the 
early 1990s, a majority of the states faced severe fiscal 
problems.47 Likewise, in fiscal year 2002, during the third 
  
2009], available at http://www.nasbo.org/publications/fiscalsurvey/fiscal 
survearchives/tabid/106/default.aspx (follow “Download” hyperlink for “2009 
Spring Fiscal Survey of States”).  
 43. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 
THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at vii­ix (June 2010) [hereinafter FISCAL SURVEY 
2010], available at http://www.nasbo.org/publications/fiscalsurvey/fiscal 
survearchives/tabid/65/default.aspx (follow “The Fiscal Survey of States, Spring 
2010” hyperlink).  
 44. See Judy Keen, States Braced to Tighten ‘10 Belts, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 
2010, at 1A. 
 45. See FISCAL SURVEY 2010, supra note 43, at vii­ix; FISCAL SURVEY 2009, 
supra note 42, at vii­ix; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET 
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at ix­x (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter FISCAL 
SURVEY 2003], available at http://www.nasbo.org/publications/fiscalsurvey/fiscal 
survearchives/tabid/106/default.aspx (follow “Download” hyperlink for “2003 
Fall Fiscal Survey of States”); Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, The 
Relative Variability of State Income and Sales Taxes Over the Revenue Cycle, 23 
ATLANTIC ECON. J. 97, 97 (1995). In order to cover budget shortfalls in 1991, 
forty­five states cut $8 billion from budgets already enacted to cover the rising 
costs of Medicaid and AFDC, twenty­six states raised taxes by $10 billion, and 
twenty­three states planned tax hikes for 1992. Vivian Brownstein, Why State 
Budgets Are a Mess, FORTUNE, June 3, 1991, at 21, 30. Similarly, thirty states 
anticipated budget shortfalls in 1981, Robert Pear, Study Finds States in Fiscal 
Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1981, at A32, and twenty­six states increased at 
least one tax in the first eight months of 1982, George B. Merry, State 
Lawmakers’ Sticky Task: Enacting New Taxes to Fill Void Left by Shrinking 
Federal Aid, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 10, 1981, at 12. 
 46. Public Worker Outlook Austere; Fiscal Pressures Are Mounting, 915 GOV’T 
EMP. REL. REP. (BNA) 26­27 (June 1, 1981). 
 47. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Revenue Problems Endanger Budgets in Half 
the States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, § 1, at 1. In all three periods, per capita 
state tax revenues failed to keep pace with inflation, with the most recent 
decline being significantly more severe than the previous two. See J. Fred Giertz 
& Seth H. Giertz, The 2002 Downturn in State Revenues: A Comparative Review 
and Analysis, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 111, 115 & fig.2 (2004). 
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era, thirty­eight states cut budgets by a record $13.7 
billion,48 and the number of budget­cutting states increased 
to forty in the following year.49 Here, too, public employers 
resorted to desperate measures, such as the state of 
Missouri, which ordered every third light bulb to be 
unscrewed in some government buildings in an attempt to 
lower the state’s electricity bill.50 
With nearly every state required to maintain a balanced 
budget,51 states and local governments scrambled for ways 
to reduce costs.52 Not surprisingly, public employers 
commonly took aim at their workforce costs, one of their 
most significant discretionary expenses.53 Governmental 
employers have resorted to layoffs,54 hiring freezes,55 wage 
freezes,56 pay lags,57 and employee furloughs,58 among other 
options during periods of budgetary turmoil. 
  
 48. FISCAL SURVEY 2003, supra note 45, at 1. 
 49. Id. at ix, 1. The 2003 deficits were described as the worst state budget 
crisis in fifty years. See Giertz & Giertz, supra note 47, at 115 & fig.2; Daniel 
Kadlec, How to Balance a Budget, TIME, Dec. 9, 2002, at 50. 
 50. David E. Rosenbaum, States Balance Budgets With Blue Smoke and 
Mirrors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 4, at 4. 
 51. Kadlec, supra note 49, at 50. 
 52. See FISCAL SURVEY 2003, supra note 45, at 1. 
 53. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1: State and Local Government Finances 
by Level of Government and by State: 2001­02, http://www.census. 
gov/govs/estimate/0200ussl_1.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). Salaries and 
wages alone constituted approximately 18.5% of all direct expenditures by the 
states during the 2001­02 fiscal year. See id. 
 54. E.g., Michael deCourcy Hinds, Early Retirements to Reduce Budgets Cost 
States Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at A1; Winston Williams, States 
Balancing Their Budgets in Oblique Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1982, at A16. 
 55. E.g., Donald P. Baker, Allen Wants $2.1 Billion in Tax Cuts: Critics 
Wonder Where He’ll Get the Money, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at A1; Oklahoma 
Lawmakers Try Again on Budget Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1984, at A13. 
 56. See, e.g., Dan Balz, As Elections Near, Mayors of Three Old Cities Look 
Like New, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1981, at A30­31; Dennis J. McGrath, Surplus 
Aside, Carlson Says No to Tax Cut, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Mar. 2, 1994, at 1B, 4B.  
 57. See, e.g., Hannelore Sudermann, UI Won’t Institute Employee Pay Lag, 
SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane), Apr. 28, 2004, at B3. 
 58. E.g., Lyle V. Harris, Budget­Cutting Proposal Includes City Furloughs, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 8, 1994, at B3. 
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Furloughs, or mandatory time off work with no pay, 
have been called the “strategy du jour” of employers seeking 
to cut costs while retaining good workers.59 Between 2007 
and 2009, over half of all states implemented mandatory 
furlough programs.60 In 2010, our two most populous 
states—California and New York—ordered furloughs for a 
total of approximately 250,000 state employees.61 Faced 
with double digit compensation losses due to the forced cut 
in work days, public employee unions challenged both 
orders in court, claiming that the orders contravene the 
terms of existing collective bargaining agreements and the 
contract clause.62  
The four periods of state budget problems arose from 
similar causes. The most recent era is attributed to the 
burst of the housing bubble and dramatically decreased tax 
revenues.63 The 2003­04 period similarly is blamed on 
shrinking tax revenues caused by the economic downturn 
and the rising cost of medical care.64 Other factors have been 
implicated as well, including homeland security costs, the 
“No Child Left Behind” educational program, and cutbacks 
in aid to the states.65 The state budget problems of the early   
 59. Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four­Day Work Weeks: 
Employer Sympathy or a Call for Collective Employee Action? 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1139, 1151 (2010) (quoting Tresa Baldas, Employment Lawyers Predict 
Furloughs May Lead to Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J. (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202430831358) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Christine Vestal, After Furloughs, States Mull Permanent Cuts, 
STATELINE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?content 
Id=440784. 
 61. See Shane Goldmacher, State Furloughs Return, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
2010, at AA3; Tom Precious, Upholding Furloughs in Court Seen as Impossible, 
BUFFALO NEWS, May 12, 2010, at A1. 
 62. See Goldmacher, supra note 61, at AA3; Precious, supra note 61, at A1, 
A3. 
 63. See Abby Goodnough, States Turning to Last Resorts in Budget Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at A1. 
 64. Rosenbaum, supra note 50, § 4, at 4; Raymond C. Scheppach, Exec. Dir., 
Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Update on the State Fiscal Crisis, NAT’L GOVERNORS 
ASS’N, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.6c9a8a9ebc6ae07eee28aca 
9501010a0/?vgnextoid=2beb4c33c7732010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD&vgn
extchannel=0dab8f2005361010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD (Mar. 3, 2004). 
 65. Katherine G. Willoughby, State Revenue Choices and Gubernatorial 
Initiatives, 76 SPECTRUM 14, 15 (2003). 
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1990s have been attributed primarily to the economic 
recession,66 but reduced federal aid to the states67 and 
federally mandated state spending68 also were contributing 
factors. Similarly, the budget shortfalls of the early 1980s 
were caused largely by a poor economy, and, to a lesser 
extent, decreased federal aid to the states.69 
There is evidence that the states are largely unable to 
prevent budget shortfalls during cyclical recessions.70 The 
problem of decreased tax revenues caused by economic 
downturns, a cause shared by each of these periods of 
budget shortfalls, is a problem that states are likely to 
continue to face in the future.71 Therefore, if the states 
employ the same methods to close their budget deficits that 
they have used historically, employment costs will continue 
to be targeted when times get tough for state and local 
governments.  
Complicating matters is the difficulty that state and 
local governments have with self­regulation and long­term 
planning. States could help alleviate the fiscal problems 
that accompany recessions if they would save money during 
boom periods.72 However, political pressures work against 
such responsible planning, as tax cuts become politically 
popular when governments run surpluses.73  
  
 66. See Janet G. Stotsky, Coping with State Budget Deficits, BUS. REV., Jan.­
Feb. 1991, at 13­14.  
 67. Id. at 14, 18. 
 68. Hinds, supra note 47, § 1, at 1. 
 69. Steven D. Gold, Federal Aid and State Finances, 35 NAT’L TAX J. 373, 380­
81 (1982). The fiscal crises in 1981 may have been caused in part or exacerbated 
by federal government actions to shift burdens onto state and local 
governments. See A Challenge to the GOP’s New Grass­Roots Power, BUS. WK. 
(SPECIAL REPORT: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TROUBLE), Oct. 26, 1981, at 
176, 178. 
 70. Giertz & Giertz, supra note 47, at 112, 129­30. 
 71. Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 45, at 111. 
 72. See id.; James A. Papke, The Response of State­Local Government 
Taxation to Fiscal Crisis, 36 NAT’L TAX J. 401, 404 (1983). 
 73. See id. 
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III. COMPARING UNILATERAL CHANGE RULES IN THE PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
The bilateral determination of terms and conditions of 
employment constitutes a fundamental cornerstone of 
modern labor relations. Indeed, the bilateral collective 
bargaining process between unions and employers is the 
principal source of employee voice in the American 
workplace.74 Unilateral action—the alteration of existing 
terms, policies, or practices by only one party privy to a 
collective bargaining relationship—generally diminishes 
voice as well as the therapeutic nature of the collective 
bargaining process.  
Unilateral change, however, is not always unlawful, and 
the range of permissible unilateral action varies by sector. 
Although private sector unilateral change rules serve as a 
starting point for determining public sector unilateral 
change rules, courts and state labor boards have seized on 
real and perceived differences between the two sectors to 
permit a greater degree of unilateral change in the public 
sector.  
A.  Private Sector 
Unilateral change rules in the private sector underscore 
the role of bilateral negotiation as a usual condition 
precedent to the adjustment of terms and conditions of 
employment.75 The NLRA requires employers and labor 
organizations to bargain in good faith over “wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment.”76 As the 
Supreme Court acknowledged in NLRB v. Wooster Division 
of Borg­Warner Corp., the duty to bargain extends only to 
those mandatory subjects.77 Although neither party is forced 
  
 74. See STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE 
OBJECTIVES: BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 106­08 
(2009). 
 75. The rules governing unilateral change in the private sector are relatively 
well­established. For discussion of these rules, see generally Terrence H. 
Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 
(1977); Robert J. Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. 
L. REV. 133 (1974).  
 76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (2006). 
 77. 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
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to make concessions on mandatory subjects,78 the parties are 
required to bargain in good faith with a present intention to 
find a basis for agreement.79 Conversely, the parties have no 
obligation to bargain over non­mandatory or permissive 
subjects,80 and unilateral action generally is lawful with 
regard to such topics absent an agreement to the contrary.81 
Courts tend to construe the scope of mandatory bargaining 
broadly and limit permissive bargaining subjects to topics 
that do not significantly relate to terms and conditions of 
employment82 or that involve managerial concerns going to 
the “core of entrepreneurial control.”83  
Although the prevailing unilateral change rules for 
private sector bargaining vary depending on the presence or 
absence of a collective bargaining agreement, the 
bargaining obligation predominates in both contexts. In 
NLRB v. Katz, a case that arose in the absence of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court held 
that an employer’s unilateral implementation of changes in 
existing wage, sick leave, and merit pay plans without 
bargaining with the exclusive representative constituted a 
per se violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, even in the 
absence of bad faith.84 The Katz decision does not completely 
  
 78. § 158(d). 
 79. See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960); 
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683­84 (9th Cir. 1943). 
 80. See Borg­Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349 (“As to other [non­mandatory] 
matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or 
not to agree.”). 
 81. See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680­86 (1981); Allied 
Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 187­88 (1971). The NLRA and other legislation 
prohibit the inclusion in a labor agreement of a third class of “illegal” subjects, 
and parties may not condition an agreement on inclusion of such terms even if 
they relate to wages, hours, or working conditions. See In re Nat’l Mar. Union of 
Am., 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 981­82 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 82. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 
24 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that employer had no duty to bargain over its 
decision to relocate); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 547­48 
(4th Cir. 1967) (holding that employer had no duty to bargain over prices set by 
independent contractor who operated cafeterias in its plants). 
 83. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
 84. 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). 
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eliminate the possibility of unilateral action, however, since 
either party,85 after bargaining to impasse,86 may implement 
“unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended 
within [its] pre­impasse proposals.”87  
Rules governing unilateral change during the term of a 
collective bargaining agreement are more complex. In this 
setting, the NLRA’s preference for the bargaining process 
must be balanced against the stability afforded by 
adherence to the bargain already struck. Section 8(d) states 
that the duty to bargain described in that section “shall not 
be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to 
any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a 
contract for a fixed period.”88 The determinative factor is 
whether a topic is “contained in” the contract. If a 
bargaining proposal seeks to modify a term contained in the 
contract, neither party lawfully may insist on bargaining, 
and the term can be changed only with the mutual consent 
of the parties.89 Even if the topic is not already addressed in 
the contract, neither party may implement a mandatory 
bargaining proposal without first bargaining to impasse.90  
The unilateral change proscription also applies to the 
period following the expiration of a bargaining agreement, 
  
 85. Unilateral change rules technically apply to the conduct of both 
employers and labor organizations. Of course, employers are more often in a 
position to effectuate unilateral action, and this Article focuses on their conduct. 
See NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2006). A few cases, however, have 
found that unions that force a change in working conditions without bargaining 
violate § 8(b)(3). See, e.g., N.Y. Dist. Council No. 9, Int’l Bhd. of Painters & 
Allied Trades v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1971) (condemning union’s 
unilateral imposition of work quota). 
 86. The determination of whether an “impasse” exists is a highly fact­specific 
inquiry in which the NLRB attempts to determine whether, despite good faith 
bargaining efforts, the parties have reached the point of deadlock. See TruServ 
Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Duffy Tool & Stamping, 
L.L.C. v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding NLRB decision 
ruling that unilateral action may not be premised on the existence of an impasse 
on only one of many topics under negotiation).  
 87. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). 
 88. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 89. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 285, 289­94 (1957); C & S Indus., 
Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 460 (1966). 
 90. See, e.g., Int’l Woodworkers of Am., Local 3­10 v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 628, 
629­30 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
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during which time the parties may not alter the status quo 
concerning mandatory terms without first bargaining to 
impasse.91 The status quo that the parties must maintain is 
a dynamic one that encompasses a past pattern of periodic 
adjustments. Thus, an employer commits an unfair labor 
practice by refusing to provide regularly scheduled wage or 
merit increases provided in an expired contract unless 
bargaining results in either a different agreement or an 
impasse.92  
The private sector unilateral change rules therefore 
emphasize collective negotiation as the preferred process for 
establishing employment terms.93 Consistent with this 
overriding preference for the bargaining process, the 
NLRB94 and courts95 refuse to recognize economic factors as 
a justification for unilateral change. In Oak Cliff­Golman 
Baking Co., for example, the employer unilaterally reduced 
the wage rates specified in the current collective bargaining 
agreement in response to a severe economic crisis.96 In 
rejecting the employer’s economic necessity defense, the 
NLRB stated that “[n]owhere in the statutory terms is any 
authority granted to us to excuse the commission of the 
proscribed action because of a showing either that such 
action was compelled by economic need or that it may have 
  
 91. See, e.g., Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991); 
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight 
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.6 (1988) (quoting NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 
743 (1962)). Contract terms that govern the employer­union relationship, 
however, generally do not survive contract expiration. See Warren C. Ogden et 
al., The Survival of Contract Terms Beyond the Expiration of a Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, 32 LAB. L.J. 119, 121 (1981). 
 92. See Reed Seismic Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting 
NLRB v. S. Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1964)).  
 93. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of the United States to . . . encourag[e] the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining . . . .”); see also David P. Findling & William E. Colby, 
Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board—
Another View, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 170, 170 (1951) (stating that collective 
bargaining forms the foundation for the national labor policy). 
 94. See, e.g., FWD Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 1300, 1301 (1981); Morelli Constr. Co., 
240 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1190 (1979). 
 95. See, e.g., Arco Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 96. 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced mem., 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975). 
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served what may appear to us to be a desirable economic 
objective.”97 Thus, although economic necessity may justify a 
particular bargaining posture, it cannot, short of 
bankruptcy, warrant repudiation of the bargaining process 
itself or of the resulting contractual commitments. 
B.  Public Sector  
Since public employers are expressly excluded from 
coverage under the NLRA,98 the regulation of state and local 
labor relations is left to the individual states which have 
adopted a variety of approaches. Approximately 80% of the 
states have adopted statutes authorizing collective 
bargaining for at least some groups of public employees.99 
Some of these statutes cover state and local employees 
comprehensively, while a greater number apply only to 
certain occupational groups such as teachers or public 
safety employees.100 On the other hand, a handful of states 
have statutes that prohibit public sector collective 
bargaining.101 Still another small group of states has no 
legislation dealing with public sector bargaining rights.102 In 
some of these jurisdictions, legislative silence is deemed 
tantamount to a ban on collective bargaining,103 while in 
other jurisdictions courts permit collective bargaining on a 
voluntary basis.104 Clearly, public employers in jurisdictions 
that do not permit collective bargaining have full unilateral 
authority to set and alter terms and conditions of 
employment.  
  
 97. Id. at 1064. 
 98. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
 99. GRODIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 82.  
 100. Id. at 88­91. 
 101. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1­57.2 (2010) (providing that no public 
employer in the state has any authority to enter into any collective bargaining 
agreement).  
 102. See James C. May, The Law and Politics of Paying Teachers Salary Step 
Increases upon Expiration of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 20 VT. L. REV. 
753, 776­80 (1996). 
 103. See id. at 776 & nn.155, 157, 160, 163. 
 104. See, e.g., Littleton Educ. Ass’n v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 553 P.2d 793, 
795­97 (Colo. 1976). 
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Most jurisdictions with comprehensive bargaining laws 
espouse unilateral change principles similar to those in the 
private sector. Labor boards and courts in these states find 
that it is an unfair labor practice for public employers to 
unilaterally alter terms established in current105 or 
expired106 collective bargaining agreements without 
engaging in the collective bargaining process. Many 
decisions also follow Oak Cliff­Golman Baking Co. in 
holding that economic hardship does not justify the 
unilateral modification of employment terms.107 Most 
jurisdictions also similarly find that a public employer may 
lawfully modify existing terms after first bargaining to 
impasse,108 although this point in time is often delayed until 
the completion of required dispute resolution procedures 
such as mediation and fact­finding.109 
Unilateral change nonetheless is more prevalent in the 
public sector, with the bases for such expanded unilateral 
change opportunities corresponding to the perceived 
structural and political process differences between 
collective bargaining in the two sectors.110 As discussed in an 
earlier article, these additional unilateral change 
possibilities generally occur for the following reasons:  
1) Diffused management authority resulting from the 
separation of governmental powers, such as where the 
bargaining and appropriations functions are vested in 
different governmental entities;  
  
 105. See, e.g., Wilkes­Barre Twp. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 878 A.2d 977, 983 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
 106. See, e.g., Educ. Minn.­Greenway, Local 1330 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 
673 N.W.2d 843, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Appeal of City of Nashua Bd. of 
Educ., 695 A.2d 647, 653 (N.H. 1997); Cent. Dauphin Educ. Ass’n v. Cent. 
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 792 A.2d 691, 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).  
 107. See, e.g., Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993); 
AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390, 391 (Iowa 1992); Prof’l. 
Staff Cong./CUNY v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 373 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
 108. See, e.g., Alaska Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 776 P.2d 1030, 1032­33 
(Alaska 1989). 
 109. See, e.g., Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 
191 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Mountain Valley Educ. Ass’n v. Me. 
Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 43, 655 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1995); AFSCME Council 25 v. 
Wayne Cnty., 393 N.W.2d 889, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
 110. See Befort, Public Sector Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1231­35.  
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2) Governmental lawmaking that modifies a previously 
negotiated agreement; 
3) The preemption of negotiated terms by a pre­
existing statute or rule; 
4) A more restricted scope of mandatory bargaining in 
the public sector; 
5) A denial of contract enforcement due to public policy 
grounds and/or the elimination of permissive bargaining 
topics in some jurisdictions; and 
6) The rejection of the dynamic status quo doctrine in 
favor of a static status quo doctrine.111  
This Article focuses on the second­listed reason—the 
government’s law­making function. Here the source of 
unilateral action generally is the state legislature. As the 
supreme law­making body of state government, the 
legislature retains the authority to amend its own collective 
bargaining legislation and to enact superseding statutes 
governing employment matters, subject only to 
constitutional restraints.112 The contract clause of the 
United States Constitution113 is the principal constitutional 
limitation on the legislature’s authority to modify existing 
collective bargaining agreements. After a brief discussion of 
bankruptcy as a unilateral change alternative, the next 
Part examines the tug­of­war between the law­making 
function and the contract clause in the context of cyclical 
periods of public sector fiscal crises. 
C.  The Bankruptcy Alternative  
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court 
held that a bankruptcy court may authorize the rejection of 
a collective bargaining agreement in a bankruptcy 
reorganization proceeding if the agreement burdens the 
employer’s estate and the equities balance in favor of 
rejection.114 The Court also rejected the applicability of 
  
 111. See id. at 1235­74. 
 112. See generally UAW v. Fortuño, 645 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D. P.R. 2009) 
(explaining that a legislature generally retains the right to suspend or modify 
previously enacted legislation). 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 114. 465 U.S. 513, 526­27 (1984). 
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NLRA § 8(d) in the reorganization context and held that an 
employer, as a debtor­in­possession following the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition, does not commit an unfair labor 
practice by unilaterally altering contract terms prior to the 
bankruptcy court’s formal rejection of the contract.115  
Congress moved quickly to modify the Bildisco decision 
by amending Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, applicable 
to the reorganization of private businesses, so as to add a 
new § 1113, which specifically addresses the rejection of 
collective bargaining agreements.116 Section 1113 provides 
that prior to rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, 
a debtor­in­possession must make a proposal to the 
authorized employee representative that outlines those 
contract modifications necessary to permit reorganization 
and must confer in good faith with the representative in an 
attempt to reach agreement.117 Such a proposal must treat 
all debtors, creditors, or other affected parties fairly and 
equitably.118 The bankruptcy court may reject the labor 
contract only if the union representative refuses to accept 
the proposal “without good cause” and the “balance of the 
equities clearly favors rejection.”119 Section 1113 also 
prohibits unilateral modification by the debtor­in­possession 
in the absence of a bankruptcy court determination that the 
interim changes are “essential to the continuation of the 
debtor’s business, or [needed] in order to avoid irreparable 
damage to the estate.”120 
The Bankruptcy Code, in Chapter 9, also authorizes 
municipal entities to file a petition for reorganization.121 
Since Section 1113 only applies to Chapter 11 proceedings, 
the Bildisco decision continues to provide the applicable 
standard for the rejection of collective agreements in 
municipal bankruptcy proceedings.122 Although the Bildisco   
 115. Id. at 534.  
 116. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2006). 
 117. § 1113(b)(1), (2). 
 118. § 1113(b)(1)(A). 
 119. § 1113(c). 
 120. § 1113(e). 
 121. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901­46 (2006). 
 122. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 183 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1995); 
Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements and Chapter 9 
Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 297 (2007). 
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standard appears to provide an easier path for municipal 
employers seeking the rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement,123 very few municipalities have utilized this 
process.124 This is likely due to two factors. First, a 
municipality may file a Chapter 9 petition only with the 
consent of the state in which the municipality is located.125 
Second, a municipality is eligible to invoke Chapter 9 
procedures only if it is insolvent.126 
While bankruptcy provides an alternative means for an 
employer to obtain relief from the terms of an existing 
collective bargaining agreement, this route differs from 
unilateral modifications in a number of important respects. 
For one thing, the rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement can be accomplished in bankruptcy only with the 
approval of a third­party decision maker, as opposed to the 
unfettered action of the employer itself.127 In addition, a 
bankruptcy court typically will consider the other 
obligations and assets of the employer rather than just the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement in isolation.128 
IV. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE THROUGH THREE PERIODS OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR BUDGET CRISIS  
A.  The Contract Clause 
The contract clause of the United States Constitution 
provides that “No [s]tate shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw 
  
 123. See Dahl, supra note 122, at 297, 314. 
 124. See id. at 335­36 (describing Chapter 9 bankruptcy as “an extraordinary 
remedy of last resort”); see also W. Richard Fossey, Inability to Pay Salaries 
Under Collective Bargaining Agreements—U.S. Bankruptcy Court as a School 
District’s Option, 50 EDUC. L. REP. 651, 651 (1989) (identifying two school 
districts that had resorted to Chapter 9 proceedings). 
 125. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). 
 126. § 109(c)(3). 
 127. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (2006) (providing that a bankruptcy court may 
authorize the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement only if the balance 
of the equities favors rejection). 
 128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring a bankruptcy court to 
consider whether the proposal for rejection treats all debtors, creditors, and 
other affected parties “fairly and equitably”). 
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impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts . . . .”129 The 
apparent purpose underlying the adoption of the contract 
clause was to prevent states from hampering commercial 
activity through the enactment by states of debtor relief 
laws.130 For the first century of this country’s existence, 
“[t]he contract clause was the primary [federal] 
constitutional restraint on state and local regulation of 
business . . . .”131  
The relative importance of the contract clause began to 
wane following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the development of the Supreme Court’s due process 
jurisprudence.132 An even greater limitation stemmed from 
the rise of the police power doctrine, which recognized the 
right of the states to enact legislation designed to serve the 
public interest.133 Over time, the Supreme Court came to 
recognize that state regulation does not violate the contract 
clause where it is reasonably tailored to “promote the 
health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the community.”134   
The police power limitation reached its zenith in the 
Supreme Court’s landmark 1934 decision in Home Building 
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.135 That decision involved a 
contract clause challenge to the Minnesota Mortgage 
Moratorium Law, a depression­era statute that permitted 
courts to extend the time during which a debtor could 
redeem mortgaged property.136 The law did not invalidate 
the underlying mortgage, but it did authorize a 
postponement in foreclosure rights so long as the debtor 
  
 129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 130. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 205, 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 
1977); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment 
“Doctrine” and its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1380­
83 (1992).  
 131. Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of 
State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 187­88 (1985).  
 132. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 & n.12 
(1978) (citing Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 
57 HARV. L. REV. 852, 890­91). 
 133. See Clarke, supra note 131, at 190­92. 
 134. Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 559 (1914).  
 135. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 136. Id. at 415­18. 
2011] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 23 
paid the rental value of the property to the lender during 
the interim period.137 After summarizing the existing case 
law, the Supreme Court stated that the pertinent “question 
is not whether the legislative action affects contracts 
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the 
legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the 
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that 
end.”138 Thus, even though the Minnesota law directly 
conflicted with contract­based foreclosure rights, the 
Blaisdell Court upheld the law on the grounds that the 
state retains the authority “to safeguard the vital interests 
of its people.”139 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
stressed five significant attributes of the Minnesota statute: 
First, the state legislature had declared in the Act itself that an 
emergency need for the protection of homeowners existed. Second, 
the state law was enacted to protect a basic societal interest, not a 
favored group. Third, the relief was appropriately tailored to the 
emergency that it was designed to meet. Fourth, the imposed 
conditions were reasonable. And, finally, the legislation was 
limited to the duration of the emergency.140 
After many years of deferring to state legislative 
impairments, in 1977 the Supreme Court revitalized the 
contract clause in the context of government contracts. In 
United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,141 the 
Court invalidated a New Jersey statute that retroactively 
repealed a covenant between the state and certain 
bondholders that limited the use of revenues pledged as 
security for rail passenger transportation purposes.142 In 
striking down the New Jersey statute, the Supreme Court 
adopted a heightened standard for scrutinizing laws that 
impair public contracts, stating that “complete deference to 
a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is 
not appropriate because the State’s self­interest is at 
  
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 438. 
 139. Id. at 434. 
 140. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978) 
(citations omitted) (summarizing Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444­47). 
 141. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 142. See id. at 9­14. 
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stake[,]”143 and that “a State is not completely free to 
consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a 
par with other policy alternatives.”144 The Court went on to 
explain that a more exacting standard is appropriate in this 
context because: 
A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, 
especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State could 
reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the 
money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the 
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.145  
The impairment of public contracts is constitutional, the 
Court stated, only if it is “reasonable and necessary to serve 
an important public purpose.”146 The Court noted that an 
impairment is “reasonable” only if the parties did not 
foresee at the time of contracting the possibility of changed 
circumstances,147 and is “necessary” only if there are no less 
drastic alternatives available for safeguarding the public 
interest.148  
A year later, the Court appeared to increase its scrutiny 
of private contracts as well.149 Subsequent decisions, 
however, found the Court reverting to its longstanding 
policy of giving substantial deference to legislative police 
power actions that serve to modify private contracts.150  
Those decisions, however, did not undercut the applicability 
of United States Trust to governmental contracts,151 and the   
 143. Id. at 26. 
 144. Id. at 30. 
 145. Id. at 26. 
 146. Id. at 25.  
 147. Id. at 31­32. 
 148. Id. at 29­31. 
 149. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242­51  (1978) 
(holding a Minnesota statute imposing a pension funding charge on certain 
employers terminating their plan or leaving the state to be an unconstitutional 
impairment of contract obligations). 
 150. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
409­19 (1983) (finding Kansas statute limiting ceiling prices on natural gas sold 
intrastate consistent with contract clause); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 
176, 187­94 (1983) (finding Alabama statute increasing severance tax on oil and 
gas not in violation of contract clause).  
 151. See Clarke, supra note 131, at 210­11. 
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lower courts continue to apply the principles of United 
States Trust when analyzing legislation attempting to 
modify collective bargaining agreements.152  
Contract clause analysis is particularly significant when 
a state legislative body attempts such modifications. The 
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in AFSCME 
Council 6 v. Sundquist153 illustrates that the unilateral 
modification of public sector bargaining agreements by a 
state legislature generally implicates constitutional, as 
opposed to statutory, issues. In Sundquist, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court upheld a statute passed by the Minnesota 
legislature adopting, inter alia,154 a new leave­of­absence 
policy for state employees.155 Although the court 
acknowledged that the adoption of this policy resulted in 
the unilateral alteration of employment terms established 
in existing collective bargaining agreements,156 it held that 
the new statutory provision could not be challenged as an 
unfair labor practice because the Minnesota Public 
Employment Labor Relations Act, like most other state 
bargaining laws,157 did not include the legislature within its 
definition of a “public employer.”158 The court explained that 
the sole avenue for challenging a unilateral legislative 
modification of collective bargaining agreement terms is to 
proceed under state and federal constitutional provisions.159   
 152. See infra Part IV.B­D.  
 153. 338 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1983). 
 154. The principal legislative action challenged in Sundquist was a 
requirement that various state and local employees contribute an additional two 
percent of their salaries to their pension funds during 1983. Id. at 565. The 
court upheld this provision on the grounds that the legislature’s modification of 
contribution rates did not abridge any contract rights, id. at 567­69, and that 
pension matters are illegal topics of bargaining under Minnesota’s public sector 
labor relations statute, id. at 575­76. 
 155. Specifically, the Act provided that through the first half of 1983, state 
employees taking unpaid leaves of absence could continue to accrue most of 
their fringe benefits as if they had been working during the period of their 
leaves. Id. at 565. 
 156. Id. at 577. 
 157. See Blair, supra note 20, at 11.  
 158. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d at 577. Minnesota’s bargaining law at the time 
provided that the Commissioner of Employee Relations was the statutory 
“employer” of all state employees. See MINN. STAT. § 179A.22(2) (1984). 
 159. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d at 577. 
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Thus, unilateral action that would be an unfair labor 
practice if undertaken by any other public or private 
employer is lawful if done by the state legislature as long as 
the action is not unconstitutional. The contract clause 
represents the principal constitutional check on such 
legislative action.160 
The remainder of this Part examines the judicial 
construction of the contract clause in reaction to legislative 
modifications of collective bargaining agreements. This 
examination occurs in a largely chronological fashion that 
reflects the periodic cycles of public sector budgetary crises 
that have spurred such legislative actions. As this 
examination illustrates, while contemporary public sector 
collective bargaining may have emerged during the fiscal 
heydays of the 1960s and 1970s,161 cyclical budgetary 
shortfalls over the next thirty years have repeatedly tested 
the inherent tension between public sector collective 
bargaining and the legislative law­making function.   
B. Legislative Modifications: The 1970s and 1980s  
The first two courts to address this issue adopted very 
different modes of analysis. They also reached very different 
results.  
In Subway­Surface Supervisors Ass’n v. New York City 
Transit Authority,162 the New York Court of Appeals upheld 
the validity of the 1975 Financial Emergency Act for the 
City of New York, an act that suspended all employee wage 
increases for a one­year period.163 The statute impaired the 
collective bargaining agreement covering a unit of city 
transit workers by eliminating a 5% wage increase for the 
second year of a two­year contract.164 Stating that the 
legislative determination deserves at least “some 
deference[,]” the court found that the circumstances of the 
fiscal crisis “clearly demonstrate that the Legislature’s 
conclusion was a valid one.”165 As an important factor, the   
 160. See Befort, Public Sector Bargaining, supra note 5, at 1246.  
 161. See supra notes 19­25 and accompanying text. 
 162. 375 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1978). 
 163. Id. at 387­88. 
 164. Id. at 387. 
 165. Id. at 390. 
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court noted the impact of the Act was merely prospective in 
nature; the suspended future increases were considered 
unearned and not vested since the employees had the right 
to quit in response to the legislative modification.166 Finally, 
the court held the preferential treatment it previously gave 
the contract rights of municipal bondholders167 did not 
create an equal protection problem because the bondholders’ 
rights had vested and the impairment of their rights would 
have a significantly greater impact than would impairing 
employee rights in terms of worsening the City’s credit 
rating.168  
The California Supreme Court took an approach that 
was less deferential to legislative modification in Sonoma 
County Organization of Public Employees v. County of 
Sonoma.169 In response to Proposition 13, which eliminated 
approximately $7 billion in property tax revenues that 
would have been available to municipal governments, the 
California legislature enacted a bill that distributed $5 
billion in surplus state funds to local entities on the 
condition that the recipient entities would not implement 
wage increases for the 1978­1979 fiscal year.170 Like the 
legislative action in Subway­Surface Supervisors, this 
action modified several collective bargaining agreements 
providing for second­year wage adjustments.171 The Sonoma 
County Public Employees court, in holding that the action of 
the California legislature unconstitutionally impaired the 
employees’ right to contract, distinguished Subway­Surface 
Supervisors on several grounds. The court noted that New 
York City’s fiscal crisis was more severe than California’s172 
  
 166. Id. at 390­91. 
 167. See Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 850 
(N.Y. 1976). 
 168. Subway­Surface Supervisors, 375 N.E.2d at 391. 
 169. 591 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). 
 170. Id. at 3, 8. 
 171. See id. at 3; Subway­Surface Supervisors, 375 N.E.2d at 387. 
 172. Although everyone acknowledged the severity of the fiscal crisis in New 
York City, the crisis created in California by Proposition 13 was largely 
ameliorated by the legislature’s subsequent distribution of surplus funds. See 
Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps., 591 P.2d at 8­9. Because the government 
failed in Sonoma County Public Employees to establish the existence of a true 
emergency, the court did not rule on the union’s contention that any emergency 
resulting from the adoption of Proposition 13 was created by the state’s 
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and that the impairment in the New York case was less 
burdensome because it merely deferred, rather than 
eliminated, the wage increases.173 In addition to drawing 
these factual distinctions, the California court rejected the 
supposition in Subway­Surface Supervisors that the 
elimination of future wage increases provided for in a 
contract abridged only prospective, non­vested rights.174 The 
Sonoma County Public Employees court instead found that 
a multiple­year contract constitutes an indivisible whole for 
which employees render consideration from the time of its 
commencement, explaining:  
[W]e seriously question the New York court’s rationale. A contract 
must be viewed as a whole; it cannot be fractured into isolated 
components. The anticipated wage increases during the second 
year thereof may have affected the employees’ wage demands for 
the first year of the contract, and undoubtedly many employees 
rendered their services in the first year in anticipation of their 
contractual right to the second year increase. It is doubtful, 
therefore, that the New York court was correct in its conclusion 
that the employees had not rendered consideration for the second 
year of the contract when the freeze was imposed.175  
The two remaining decisions issued during this period 
continued this disparate view. In Local Division 589, 
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, a 1981 
decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 
legislative modification against a contract clause 
challenge.176 In that case, the Massachusetts legislature 
passed a statute changing the arbitration process for 
resolving future transit bargaining disputes, ostensibly for 
the purpose of “hold[ing] down rapidly rising transit 
costs.”177 The First Circuit reviewed the United States Trust 
decision and, while noting that “complete deference” to 
  
voluntary conduct in limiting its taxing authority and, therefore, could not 
justify an impairment of contract. The court did indicate, however, that it found 
this argument “appealing.” See id. at 10. 
 173. Id. at 9. 
 174. See id. at 9­10. 
 175. Id. at 10. 
 176. 666 F.2d 618, 620 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 177. Id. at 621. The principal change affected by the legislation was to reduce 
the size of interest arbitration panels from three members to a single arbitrator. 
Id. at 622. 
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legislative action is not appropriate with respect to the 
alteration of government contracts, found that at least some 
level of deference is appropriate: “We do not believe that 
United States Trust requires the federal courts to go further 
to reexamine de novo all the factors underlying the 
legislation and to make a totally independent determination 
about whether a fare increase or some other alternative 
would have constitute a ‘better’ statutory solution.”178 In this 
instance, the court concluded that the legislature’s 
modification had only a slight impact on reliance interests 
since the modification affected only the future form of the 
arbitration process rather than the substance of a particular 
outcome.179 
Four years later, the Washington Supreme Court 
reached a very different outcome in Carlstrom v. State.180 In 
that case, the Washington state legislature, citing 
budgetary concerns, rescinded an earlier appropriation that 
funded an already negotiated salary increase for community 
college teachers.181 The court found that the legislative 
modification was not “reasonable” for contract clause 
purposes, explaining that “[s]ince the State was fully aware 
of its financial problems while negotiating and prior to 
signing the Agreement, it cannot now be permitted to avoid 
the Agreement based on those same economic 
circumstances. Although the financial situation worsened, it 
was a change in degree, not in kind.”182 
The Washington court also distinguished the Subway­
Surface Supervisors decision by noting that the impairment 
at issue in that case allegedly implicated health and safety 
considerations, while the state asserted only financial 
considerations in this case.183  
  
 178. Id. at 642. 
 179. Id. at 640 (describing the change as “procedural and therefore more akin 
to a contractual remedy than a contractual right”). 
 180. 694 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1985). 
 181. Id. at 3. 
 182. Id. at 5­6. 
 183. Id. at 5 (suggesting that financial considerations alone do not constitute 
sufficient police power grounds to justify an impairment of contract).  
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C. Legislative Modifications: The 1990s  
Judicial decisions during the 1990s focused primarily on 
the constitutionality of legislative acts that temporarily 
deferred or reduced public employee wages in violation of 
applicable collective bargaining agreements. Courts 
generally applied a three­pronged test fashioned on 
principles established in the United States Trust decision.184 
This test inquires: (1) whether state action in fact impaired 
a contractual obligation; (2) whether the impairment is 
substantial in nature; and (3) whether the impairment 
nonetheless is reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.185 Courts utilizing this approach 
generally balance the severity of the contractual 
impairment with the state’s need to take such action in the 
broader public interest.186  
A number of decisions found “lag­payroll statutes” to be 
in violation of the contract clause.187 A “lag­payroll statute” 
essentially operates as an involuntary loan to a public 
employer by delaying the point in time in which employees 
receive payment of wages or salaries already earned.188 
  
 184. See U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 185. See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th 
Cir. 1993); Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708,712­13 
(Mass. 1995). 
 186. Mass. Cmty. Coll., 649 N.E.2d at 713 (“The extent of any impairment is a 
factor in determining its reasonableness, as is the importance of the public 
purpose to be served. An impairment is not a reasonable one if the problem 
sought to be resolved by an impairment of a contract existed at the time the 
contractual obligation was incurred. If the foreseen problem has changed 
between the time of the contracting and the time of the attempted impairment, 
but has changed only in degree and not in kind, the impairment is not 
reasonable.”) (citations omitted).  
 187. See, e.g., Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1101­
06 (9th Cir. 1999); Condell v. Bress, 983 F.2d 415, 417­20 (2d Cir. 1993); Ass’n of 
Surrogates & Sup. Ct. Reporters v. New York (Surrogates I), 940 F.2d 766, 771­
74 (2d Cir. 1991); Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 672­73 (Fla. 
1993); Ass’n of Surrogates & Sup. Ct. Reporters v. State, 588 N.E.2d 51, 54 
(N.Y. 1992); In Re Quirk v. Regan, 565 N.Y.S.2d 422, 424­25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1991). 
 188. See, e.g., Surrogates I, 940 F.2d at 772 (describing the lag payroll scheme 
at issue in the case as having “the effect of withholding ten percent of each 
employee’s expected wages over a period of twenty weeks and postponing their 
payment indefinitely.”).  
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These courts generally were reluctant to defer to such 
unilateral modifications since they directly served the 
financial interests of the governmental entity itself.189  
The approach adopted in a majority of decisions is 
illustrated in Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court 
Reporters Within the City of New York v. New York 
(“Surrogates I”).190 In 1989, the New York judiciary 
requested $972.9 million in order to expand and better cope 
with the state’s “exploding drug crisis.”191 The state, 
unfortunately, was also facing a budget deficit at the time.192 
The New York legislature reduced the judiciary’s budget 
request by $69.1 million, but nevertheless approved the 
judiciary’s requested expansion.193 In order to pay for the 
newly created positions, the legislature imposed a lag 
payroll scheme for certain non­judicial employees of the 
court system, which conflicted with the employees’ collective 
bargaining agreements.194 The Second Circuit found that the 
impairment caused by the lag payroll was substantial, 
focusing on the effect it would have on individual 
employees.195 The court refused to examine the 
  
 189. See supra note 187. 
 190. 940 F.2d 766.  
 191. Id. at 769. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  The goal was to delay payment of employees’ salaries until two weeks 
after those salaries had been earned. In order to effectuate this plan, employees 
were paid for only nine days of the ten days worked in each pay period for ten 
two­week periods. By the end of the fiscal year, the affected employees were 
paid for fifty weeks’ work instead of fifty­two. The employees will be able to 
collect the withheld salary at the termination of their employment with the 
state at the rate of pay applicable to them at that time. Id. 
 195. Id. at 772.  
For instance, a 25­year­old employee would not be repaid her lagged 
wages until she leaves the state’s employ—perhaps 45 years, should 
she devote her entire career to governmental service. The affected 
employees have surely relied on full paychecks to pay for such 
essentials as food and housing. Many have undoubtedly committed 
themselves to personal long­term obligations such as mortgages, credit 
cards, car payments, and the like—obligations which might go unpaid 
in the months that the lag payroll has its immediate impact.  
Id.; see also Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“Plaintiffs are wage earners, not volunteers. They have bills, child 
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governmental fiscal crisis without also regarding the 
“personal fiscal crises that the lag payroll would create.”196  
The Second Circuit in Surrogates I also held that the lag 
payroll statute in question did not pass muster under the 
third prong of the United States Trust test, which asks 
whether the contractual impairment was “reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.”197 The 
Surrogates I court was skeptical of the necessity of a lag 
payroll plan during that year’s “perennial ‘fiscal cris[i]s.’”198 
The court read the necessary requirement narrowly to mean 
that the impairment must be essential to implement the 
particular plan due to the absence of any other possible 
alternatives. The court found, however, there were 
alternatives to a lag payroll plan, albeit politically 
unpopular ones, like raising taxes or shifting money from 
other government programs.199 The court ultimately 
concluded that the legislature had not shown  it was 
necessary to “plac[e] the costs of improvements to the court 
system on the few shoulders of judiciary employees instead 
of the many shoulders of the citizens of the state.”200 
  
support obligations, mortgage payments, insurance premiums, and other 
responsibilities. Plaintiffs have the right to rely on the timely receipt of their 
paychecks. Even a brief delay in getting paid can cause financial 
embarrassment and displacement of varying degrees of magnitude.”); Opinion of 
the Justices, 609 A.2d 1204, 1210 (N.H. 1992) (“The bill under consideration 
here impairs the very heart of an employment contract: the promise of certain 
work for certain income. Its impact would likely wreak havoc on the finances of 
many of the affected workers and can only be considered substantial.”).  
 196. Surrogates I, 940 F.2d at 772. 
 197. U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Surrogates I, 940 
F.2d at 772­73. 
 198. Surrogates I, 940 F.2d at 774.  
 199. Id. at 773; see also Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 
(“The mere fact that it is politically more expedient to eliminate all or part of the 
contracted funds is not in itself a compelling reason. Rather, the legislature 
must demonstrate that the funds are available from no other possible 
reasonable source.”); Opinion of the Justices, 609 A.2d at 1211 (“The legislature 
has many alternatives available to it, including reducing non­contractual State 
services and raising taxes and fees. Although neither of these choices may be as 
politically feasible as the furlough program, the State cannot resort to contract 
violations to solve its financial problems.”). 
 200. Surrogates I, 940 F.2d at 773. The court went on to query, “If a state 
government could so cavalierly disregard the obligations of its own contracts, of 
what value would its promises ever be?” Id. at 774. 
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A similar view prevailed in two cases challenging 
legislatively mandated furlough programs.201 In 
Massachusetts Community College Council v. 
Commonwealth, the Massachusetts legislature responded to 
budgetary problems by requiring certain state employees to 
take a number of days off without pay.202 State employee 
unions challenged the furlough program, claiming it 
violated various collective bargaining agreement provisions 
as well as the contract clause.203  
In resolving the contract clause issue, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts focused on the 
“reasonableness” prong of the United States Trust test.204 
The court listed a number of factors to consider in 
undertaking a “reasonableness” analysis, including the 
extent of the impairment and the importance of the public 
purpose to be served.205 The Court went on to explain: 
An impairment is not a reasonable one if the problem sought to be 
resolved by an impairment of contract existed at the time the 
contractual obligation was incurred. If the foreseen problem has 
changed between the time of the contracting and the time of the 
attempted impairment, but has changed only in degree and not in 
kind, the impairment is not reasonable.206  
In applying these factors, the court concluded that any 
difference in the state’s economic situation between the time 
the collective bargaining agreement was signed (December 
1990) and the time the furlough program was implemented 
(April 1991) was a difference in degree and not a difference 
in kind.207 The court therefore held the furlough program   
 201. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708 (Mass. 1995); see 
also Opinion of the Justices, 609 A.2d 1204. “[F]urloughs are mandatory time off 
work with no pay.” Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four­Day Work 
Weeks: Employer Sympathy or a Call for Collective Empoyee Action? 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1139, 1143 n.16 (2010) (quoting Susan M. Heathfield, Employee Furloughs, 
ABOUT.COM, http://humanresources.about.com/od/glossaryf/g/furlough.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2010)). 
 202. Mass. Cmty. Coll., 649 N.E.2d at 709. 
 203. Id. at 709­10. 
 204. Id. at 713. 
 205. Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27, 29 (1977)).  
 206. Id. (citations omitted). 
 207. Id. at 716.  
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constituted a substantial impairment of state employees’ 
rights under the collective bargaining agreements which 
could “not be justified as reasonable.”208 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals took a distinctively 
different approach to the contract clause issue in Baltimore 
Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore.209 In that case, the 
Fourth Circuit found that Baltimore’s furlough plan210 
constituted a substantial impairment of contract rights, but 
ultimately held that the plan was permissible as a 
legitimate exercise of the state’s sovereign powers.211  
The Fourth Circuit adopted a broader reading of the 
third prong of the United States Trust test, reasoning that 
“at least some deference to legislative policy decisions to 
modify these contracts in the public interest must be 
accorded.”212 Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the 
ability to raise taxes or shift funds from one governmental 
program to another does not automatically preclude a 
finding of necessity. “Were these the proper criteria,” the 
court stated, “no impairment of a governmental contract 
could ever survive constitutional scrutiny, for these courses 
are always open, no matter how unwise they may be.”213  
The Fourth Circuit also found that the City tailored the 
plan as narrowly as possible to meets its unforeseen budget 
shortfall.214 The City of Baltimore was required by law to 
balance its budget and faced a budget crisis which was 
exacerbated when $24.2 million in state aid fell through.215 
Before enacting the furlough plan, Baltimore abandoned 
previously negotiated pay raises, and resorted to measures 
such as layoffs, job eliminations, and early retirement 
  
 208. Id.  
 209. 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 210. “Under the plan, full­time city employees, except for firefighters . . . lost 
the annual equivalent of 2.5 days of pay, or .95% of their gross annual salary, 
and Baltimore saved approximately $2 million, which it does not intend to 
refund.” Id. at 1014. 
 211. Id. at 1015. 
 212. Id. at 1019. 
 213. Id. at 1020.  
 214. Id. at 1021. 
 215. Id. at 1020. 
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programs.216 Only when the State proposed further cuts in 
state aid did the City resort to the furlough plan.217 The 
court accordingly held that the plan was “necessary.”218 
The court also held that the plan was “reasonable” 
considering the circumstances.219 The plan was designed to 
“deal with a broad, generalized economic or social 
problem.”220 The plan extended to all City employees as 
opposed to a narrow group such as in Surrogates I, and the 
plan was only temporary and was discontinued at the first 
opportunity.221 Finally, the court noted that the plan 
“affected reliance interests not wholly unlike those of 
private entities in regulated industries, which contract  
subject to future, additional regulation.”222 On this latter 
point, the court explained that “[p]ublic employees—federal 
or state—by definition serve the public and their 
expectations are necessarily defined, at least in part, by the 
public interest. It should not be wholly unexpected, 
therefore, that these public servants might well be called 
upon to sacrifice first when the public interest demands 
sacrifice.”223 
D. Legislative Modifications: The 2000s  
Three decisions in the last decade illustrate the 
continued diversity of approaches and outcomes in this area 
of law. 
In Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that unilateral action 
imposed by a legislatively­created fiscal authority passed   
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. In this context, the court concluded that the furlough plan was a 
moderate course of action that was preferable to further layoffs. See id. 
 218. See id. at 1020­21. 
 219. Id. at 1021. The court noted that “the amount of the reduction was no 
greater than that necessary to meet the anticipated shortfall . . . [and]  the plan 
did not alter pay­dependent benefits, overtime pay, hourly rates of pay, or the 
orientation of pay scales.” Id. at 1020. 
 220. Id. at 1021 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234, 250 (1978)). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id.  
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the United States Trust test.224 Following a report of the 
state comptroller’s office describing the City of Buffalo’s 
fiscal woes, the New York state legislature passed an act 
establishing the Buffalo Fiscal Authority (the “Authority”), 
a public benefit corporation with delegated authority to 
impose wage and hiring freezes as may be essential to the 
maintenance of the City’s long range financial plan.225 After 
discovering a budget gap greater than previously estimated, 
in spite of having earlier instituted a freeze on hiring and 
non­contractual wage increases, the Authority froze the 
wages of all city employees, including those covered by 
collective bargaining agreements providing for future term 
wage increases.226  
In considering the contract clause challenges instituted 
by several unions, the court initially addressed the level of 
deference due to the state where the employees whose 
contract rights were reduced were not on the payroll of the 
governmental entity that impaired those rights.227 While the 
court declined to identify the precise level of deference 
due,228 it noted that: 
“Where economic or social legislation is at issue, some deference to 
the legislature’s judgment is surely called for.” . . . Nor is the 
heightened scrutiny to be applied as exacting as that commonly 
understood as strict scrutiny. Such a high level of judicial scrutiny 
of the legislature’s actions would harken a dangerous return to 
the days of Lochner v. New York . . . . 229  
The court in Buffalo Teachers Federation went on to 
find that the contract impairment, although substantial in 
  
 224. 464 F.3d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 225. See id. at 365­66. 
 226. See id. at 366­67. 
 227. The defendants argued that their actions should be afforded substantial 
deference because the state did not impair one of its own obligations. See id. at 
369­70. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued for a less deferential standard 
on the grounds that the wage freeze was a self­serving measure that would 
reduce the need for future amounts of state aid. See id. at 370.  
 228. The court stated that it would “assume that the lower level of deference 
applies because . . . the wage freeze is reasonable and necessary even under the 
less deferential standard.” Id. 
 229. Id. at 370­71 (citing Local Div., 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. 
Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 643 (1st Cir. 1981)). 
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nature,230 was nonetheless reasonable under the 
circumstances.231 The court found that the wage freeze was a 
“last resort” measure that was taken only after other 
measures such as hiring freezes, school closings, and layoffs 
failed to close the budgetary gap.232 The court was also 
influenced by the “temporary and prospective nature of the 
wage freeze.”233 Even though the Authority’s action 
suspended wage increases provided for in existing 
bargaining agreements, the court found it significant that 
“[t]he impairment here does not affect past salary due for 
labor already rendered . . . .”234  
Turning to the “necessary” prong of the United States 
Trust test, the court rejected the union’s argument that tax 
increases offered an available alternative to the Authority’s 
action.235 The court stated the City had already raised taxes 
and that raising taxes should not be the only permissible 
response.236 Significantly, the court gave substantial 
deference to the governmental decision, stating, “we find no 
need to second­guess the wisdom of picking the wage freeze 
over other policy alternatives . . . .”237 Finally, the court 
distinguished its earlier Surrogates I decision on the 
grounds that, unlike the earlier case, “no one questions the 
existence of a very real fiscal emergency in Buffalo.”238  
In a second case decided in 2008, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the City of Benton, Arkansas 
violated the contract clause when it unilaterally reduced 
health care premiums for retired city employees.239 
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the City was 
  
 230. See id. at 368 (“The promise to pay a sum certain constitutes not only the 
primary inducement for employees to enter into a labor contract, but also the 
central provision upon which it can be said they reasonably rely.”). 
 231. Id. at 370­71. 
 232. Id. at 371. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 372.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 373. 
 239. AFSCME, Local 2957 v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874, 877, 882 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
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obligated to pay the full cost of health insurance premiums 
for retirees.240 During the term of the agreement, the City 
Council passed a resolution reducing the City’s premium 
contributions.241 The Eighth Circuit rejected the City’s 
argument that the unilateral modification was legitimately 
predicated on concerns of “economic necessity.”242 The court 
explained: 
Although economic concerns can give rise to the City’s legitimate 
use of the police power, such concerns must be related to 
“unprecedented emergencies,” such as mass foreclosures caused 
by the Great Depression. Further, to survive a challenge under 
the Contract Clause, any law addressing such concerns must deal 
with a broad, generalized economic or social problem.243 
The court concluded that the City’s evidence of economic 
necessity fell short of establishing the existence of an 
“unprecedented emergency” or a “broad economic problem” 
sufficient to warrant the City’s unilateral action.244  
The federal district court for Maryland reached a 
similar outcome in a case decided the following year. In 
Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George’s County, the 
court struck down a County’s furlough plan that 
unilaterally reduced work schedules by eighty hours.245 The 
court found that this reduction substantially impaired 
several union contracts by imposing a 3.85% cut in annual 
pay.246 In terms of the “reasonableness” inquiry, the court 
expressed doubts about whether the County’s revenue 
shortfalls were truly unforeseen and also found that neither 
the magnitude nor timing of the shortfalls were as severe as 
that faced by the City of Baltimore in the earlier Baltimore 
Teachers Union case.247 The court also ruled that the 
  
 240. Id. at 877. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 882. 
 243. Id. (citations omitted). 
 244. Id.  
 245. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George’s Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 
492, 501, 518­19 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 246. Id. at 510. 
 247. See id. at 514­15; see also Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 
1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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furlough plan was not “necessary” since the County had 
several more moderate alternatives available, such as 
tapping undesignated fund balances, restricting real estate 
and equipment purchases, and spreading the financial 
retrenchment more broadly.248 In the latter regard, the court 
expressed the following concern about the narrowly targeted 
nature of the furlough plan: 
[T]he County demonstrated its appreciation of the importance of 
contracts when it acknowledged that “[they] were bound by an 
agreement with the State of Maryland” and therefore could not 
implement any budget cuts for Prince George’s County Hospital. 
The County appears to have preconceived notions about the lines 
it will and will not cross in order to accomplish its objectives.249  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in a 2010 
decision.250 The Fourth Circuit’s opinion does not take issue 
with the lower court’s assessment of the reasonable and 
necessary factors, but instead found that the County’s 
furlough plan did not operate as an impairment of 
contract.251 The Fourth Circuit construed the collective 
bargaining agreements at issue as incorporating the 
County’s Personnel Law, which expressly authorizes the 
adoption of a furlough plan upon the County Executive’s 
determination that such a plan is required in order to 
respond to an ascertained shortfall in revenue.252 The 
Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that since the furlough 
plan was authorized by the collective agreements, no 
impairment resulted and an analysis of the reasonable and 
necessary factors was not required.253   
V.  CRITICAL ANALYSIS  
This Part more closely examines the contract 
clause/unilateral change jurisprudence in three respects. 
First, this Part identifies those factual issues that the 
  
 248. See Fraternal Order of Police, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 515­17.  
 249. Id. at 516 (citation omitted).  
  250. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty., 606 F.3d 
183, 193 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 251. Id. at 188­89. 
 252. Id. at 190­91. 
 253. See id. at 188­89. 
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courts have most heavily relied upon in deciding the 
contract clause issue. Second, this Part critiques the legal 
analysis used by the courts with particular emphasis on 
those decisions which have rejected contract clause 
challenges. Finally, this Part concludes by suggesting an 
analytical framework for addressing such cases in the 
future.  
A.   The Most Significant Factual Issues  
Contract clause analysis under the United States Trust 
standard is a fact­intensive endeavor. In addition to 
determining whether a substantial impairment of contract 
has occurred, the test requires a careful balancing of factors 
relating to whether such an impairment was reasonable and 
necessary under the circumstances.254 Because of the many 
factors that are potentially relevant to this analysis, it is 
often difficult to predict whether a contemplated legislative 
modification will pass constitutional muster. This Section 
attempts to enhance predictability by identifying those 
factual issues that the courts find most significant to their 
determinations.  
 1. The Severity of the Fiscal Emergency. Courts 
frequently place great weight on the severity of the fiscal 
problems confronting a public employer. For example, in 
comparing the two earliest legislative modifications in this 
set of cases, the Supreme Court of California, in finding a 
contract clause violation, placed emphasis on the finding 
that California’s fiscal crisis at issue in Sonoma County 
Public Employees was less severe than that experienced by 
New York City in Subway­Surface Supervisors.255 Viewing 
the comparison through the opposite lens, the Second 
Circuit in Buffalo Teachers Federation contrasted the 
doubtful 1990 emergency of Surrogates I with “the very real 
[2004] fiscal emergency in Buffalo.”256 For these courts, the 
  
 254. See supra notes 184­86 and accompanying text.  
 255. See Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 9­
11 (Cal. 1979).  
 256. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 373 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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greater the fiscal emergency, the more likely that a 
legislative modification will be upheld.257 
 2. Foreseeabilty. An oft­cited factor in contract clause 
decisions is whether the government’s economic problem 
was foreseeable or an “unprecedented emergency.”258 As 
explained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 
An impairment is not a reasonable one if the problem sought to be 
resolved by an impairment of a contract existed at the time the 
contractual obligation was incurred. If the foreseen problem has 
changed between the time of the contracting and the time of the 
attempted impairment, but has changed only in degree and not in 
kind, the impairment is not reasonable.259  
In contrast, a surprise budgetary emergency, such the 
unanticipated loss of state aid in Baltimore Teachers Union, 
is more likely to justify an impairment as a “reasonable” 
measure.260 
 3. The Substantiality of the Impairment. The severity 
issue is also important with respect to the nature and 
extent of the legislative modification. Under the United 
States Trust standard, a contract clause violation can be 
established only if it is shown that a substantial 
impairment of contract rights has occurred.261  
Courts have little difficulty finding such an impairment 
where legislative action reduces or eliminates compensation 
promised in a collective bargaining agreement.262 Such 
action abridges a right that that likely “induced the parties 
  
 257. See Carlstrom v. State, 694 P.2d 1, 5 (Wash. 1985) (suggesting that an 
impairment of contract is permissible if health or safety considerations, and not 
just financial considerations, are implicated).  
 258. AFSCME v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 259. Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Mass. 
1995) (citation omitted); see also Carlstrom, 694 P.2d at 5 (finding that the state 
was “fully aware of its financial problems” during negotiations and prior to 
signing the contract). 
 260. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1014, 1017­18 
(4th Cir. 1993).  
 261. See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17­21 (1977). 
 262. See, e.g., Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 4, 7 (Cal. 
1979); Carlstrom, 694 P.2d at 4­6. 
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to enter into the contract”263 initially and goes to “the very 
heart of an employment contract.”264 The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals, on the other hand, found no contract clause 
violation when the legislative action altered only the process 
for establishing terms and conditions of employment rather 
than the substantive terms of the employment 
relationship.265  
Falling in between these extremes are measures such as 
furloughs and pay­lag schemes. Here, the terms of the 
particular collective bargaining agreement may be 
determinative as to whether such action constitutes an 
impairment. While a number of courts have found 
substantial impairments where such measures reduce the 
agreed upon level of compensation or hours,266 the Fourth 
Circuit ruled that a unilaterally imposed furlough does not 
constitute an impairment where the terms of the parties’ 
agreement implicitly authorized such action.267  
4.  Availability of Alternatives. The courts almost 
uniformly indicate that the availability of alternatives to 
contract impairment is an important consideration,268 but 
they do not uniformly agree as to what measures constitute 
appropriate alternatives.269 The major area of disagreement 
  
 263. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1018. 
 264. Opinion of the Justices, 609 A.2d 1204, 1210 (N.H. 1992). 
 265. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 
618, 640 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 266. See, e.g., Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106 
(9th Cir. 1999) (lag payroll); Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 
N.E.2d 708, 709­10 (Mass. 1995) (furlough). 
 267. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty., 606 F.3d 
183, 188­89 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 268. See, e.g., Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993). 
(“[T]he legislature must demonstrate that the funds are available from no other 
possible reasonable source.”); Thomas H. Lee, Jr., Baltimore Teachers Union v. 
Mayor of Baltimore: Does the Contract Clause Have Any Vitality in the Fourth 
Circuit?, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1633, 1647 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court in 
United States Trust “established a presumption in favor of alternatives that did 
not impair public contracts.”). 
 269. Courts sustaining contract clause challenges have found that legislative 
bodies erred by not considering such alternatives as reducing non­contractual 
services and tapping undesignated reserve funds. See Fraternal Order of Police 
v. Prince George’s Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 515­17 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d on 
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concerns whether the possibility of raising taxes should be 
considered as an alternative or not. While some courts have 
adopted an affirmative position,270 two other courts have 
declined to view raising taxes as a preferential 
alternative.271 As the Fourth Circuit stated in Baltimore 
Teachers Union, if raising taxes or shifting funds between 
programs were considered to be viable alternatives, “no 
impairment of a governmental contract could ever survive 
constitutional scrutiny, for these courses are always open, 
no matter how unwise they may be.”272  
While the tax increase alternative is unclear, the 
importance of a governmental unit resorting to alternate 
measures prior to abrogating a collective agreement is not. 
Public bodies that implement alternative measures such as 
hiring freezes, layoffs, program closures, and early 
retirement incentives are more likely to withstand contract 
clause challenges if they subsequently impair contract 
terms.273 In this context, prior resort to meaningful 
alternatives that do not alleviate the fiscal crises provides 
governmental defendants with the plausible argument that 
the contract impairment was a necessary action of “last 
resort.”274 
5.  Timing. Temporal considerations come into play 
in two ways. First, courts react more favorably to 
impairments that operate only in a prospective fashion. 
Thus, a measure that alters pay or hours going forward is 
more likely to be upheld than one that eliminates 
compensation already earned.275 Two decisions have even 
applied this principle to sustain the elimination of future 
  
other grounds, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); Opinion of the Justices, 609 A.2d at 
1211. 
  270. See Ass’n of Surrogates & Sup. Ct. Reporters v. New York (Surrogates I), 
940 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); Opinion of the Justices, 609 A.2d at 1211. 
 271. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 2006); Balt. 
Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1019­20 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 272. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020. 
 273. See id. at 1019­20.  
 274. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371. 
 275. See id. at 371­72; Subway­Surface Supervisors Ass’n v. N.Y. City Transit 
Auth., 375 N.E.2d 384, 390­91 (N.Y. 1978). 
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wage increases provided by the terms of an already 
executed collective bargaining agreement.276 Second, courts 
are less offended by temporary as opposed to permanent 
modifications. A court, accordingly, is more likely to uphold 
a measure that defers wage increases than a measure that 
eliminates them.277 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has 
commented favorably on the fact that a governmental unit 
discontinued its furlough plan “at the first opportunity.”278 
6.  Sharing the Pain. Courts are less likely to uphold 
a legislative modification where it appears that a target 
group of employees are bearing a disproportionate share of 
the burden occasioned by the fiscal crisis.279 Thus, the 
Second Circuit in Surrogates I was skeptical of a 
modification that “plac[ed] the costs of improvements to the 
court system on the few shoulders of judiciary employees 
instead of the many shoulders of the citizens of the state.”280 
The federal district court in Fraternal Order of Police also 
expressed concern that the County’s furlough plan was not 
accompanied by a broader plan of financial retrenchment.281 
In contrast, the contract modification sustained in Buffalo 
Federation of Teachers was mirrored by a broad array of 
other budget­cutting measures.282 Not all courts, however, 
agree about the need for spreading the pain. As the Fourth 
  
 276. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371­72; Subway­Surface 
Supervisors, 375 N.E.2d at 390­91. 
 277. See Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 9 
(Cal. 1979) (comparing unfavorably the eliminated wage increase at issue with 
the deferred increase in Subway­Surface Supervisors). But see Ass’n of 
Surrogates & Sup. Ct. Reporters v. New York (Surrogates I), 940 F.2d 766, 772 
(2d Cir. 1991) (invalidating a pay­lag deferral scheme whereby an employee 
would not be repaid lagged wages until termination of employment). 
 278. Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 279. See, e.g., Condell v. Bress, 983 F.2d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[P]lacing the 
burden of coping with a fiscal crisis on the shoulders of only a few people . . . is 
less fair than ‘spreading the pain’ among many. We agree that the number of 
people involved is one factor to be considered on the issue of ‘reasonable and 
necessary’. . . .”) (citation omitted).  
 280. Surrogates I, 940 F.2d. at 773.  
 281. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George’s Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 
492, 516 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 282. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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Circuit stated in Baltimore Teachers Union, “public 
servants might well be called upon to sacrifice first when 
the public interest demands sacrifice.”283  
B. Analytical Shortcomings  
The factual issues discussed in the preceding section 
explain many, but not all, of the public sector contract 
clause decisions. In addition to distinctions in fact, the cases 
also illustrate distinctions in analytical approach. In 
particular, several of the decisions upholding legislative 
modifications appear to adopt approaches that depart from 
the standards enunciated in the United States Trust 
decision.   
 1. Level of Deference. While courts traditionally have 
given considerable deference to legislative policy judgments 
in deciding most types of contract clause cases,284 the 
Supreme Court in United States Trust determined that such 
deference is not appropriate where the legislative body has 
impaired one of its own contracts.285 In this context, the 
Court stated that “complete deference to a legislative 
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not 
appropriate because the State’s self­interest is at stake.”286 
As such, the Court cautioned that “a State is not completely 
free to consider impairing the obligations of its own 
contracts on a par with other policy alternatives.”287  
Most public sector contract clause decisions have 
properly applied the standard of deference established in 
the United States Trust decision.288 In Massachusetts 
Community College Council, for example, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that a “stricter 
  
 283. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021.  
 284. See Thompson, supra note 130, at 1457­59. 
 285. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26, 30 (1977). 
 286. Id. at 26. 
 287. Id. at 30­31. 
 288. See Ronald D. Wenkart, Unilateral Modification of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements in Times of Fiscal Crisis and Bankruptcy: An Unconstitutional 
Impairment of Contract?, 225 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 19 (2007) (“Even in cases of 
extreme fiscal crisis . . . the courts have been reluctant to modify or repeal the 
provisions of collective bargaining agreements.”). 
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scrutiny” was required in testing the abrogation of a 
governmental entity’s own contractual obligations.289  
In several decisions in which legislation modifications 
were sustained, however, courts appeared to give more 
deference than contemplated under the United States Trust 
decision. At least three courts have expressly stated that, 
despite the less deferential approach described in United 
States Trust, legislative modifications of public sector 
obligations deserve at least “some deference” when 
challenged on contract clause grounds.290 While this 
articulation might not seem to be necessarily inconsistent 
with United States Trust at first blush, these decisions, in 
practice, almost completely have deferred to the 
legislature’s assessment on the reasonable and necessary 
issues.291 As an example, although the New York court in 
Subway­Surface Supervisors invoked the United States 
Trust standard by name, the court did not examine 
independently the foreseeability of the fiscal crisis or the 
availability of alternatives less drastic than the elimination 
of contractual wage increases.292  
An apparent concern with literal application of the 
United States Trust standard is that, in the words of the 
Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Teachers Union, such 
application would compel the courts to sit as 
“superlegislatures,” second­guessing legislative policy 
  
 289. Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Mass. 
1995). 
 290. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 
1993); Local Div., 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 
618, 642 (1st Cir. 1981); Subway­Surface Supervisors Ass’n v. N.Y. City Transit 
Auth., 375 N.E.2d 384, 390 (N.Y. 1978); see also Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 
464 F.3d 362, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) (“less deference does not imply no deference”).  
 291. See Lee, supra note 268 at 1642, 1648 (concluding that the courts in the 
Local Division 589 and Baltimore Teachers Union decisions almost completely 
deferred to the governmental bodies abrogating contract obligations). 
 292. See Subway­Surface Supervisors, 375 N.E.2d at 388­91. Instead, the court 
simply affirmed the legislature’s finding that a fiscal emergency existed, stating, 
“[h]ere, little deference is required, when the circumstances themselves so 
clearly demonstrate that the Legislature’s conclusion was a valid one.” Id. at 
390. Although this assessment may have been factually accurate, the existence 
of a budgetary emergency does not itself justify impairment under the United 
States Trust test. 
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determinations.293 As the Second Circuit summarized in 
Buffalo Teachers Federation: 
“Where economic or social legislation is at issue, some deference to 
the legislature’s judgment is surely called for.” . . . Nor is the 
heightened scrutiny to be applied as exacting as that commonly 
understood as strict scrutiny. Such a high level of judicial scrutiny 
of the legislature’s actions would harken a dangerous return to 
the days of Lochner v. New York. . . . 294  
It is true that courts in the post­Lochner era do not 
undertake a de novo review of legislation on substantive due 
process grounds. In this realm, a legislative body’s 
enactment of economic and social legislation in furtherance 
of its police power is entitled to considerable deference.295  
A more apt analogy in this context, however, may be 
drawn to jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Here, the United States Supreme Court has created a 
method of analyzing the legitimacy of legislative 
enactments based on the identity of the group classification 
embodied in the legislation. Under the Court’s analytical 
framework, the intensity of scrutiny correlates with the 
likelihood that the state has singled out for unfavorable 
treatment a group that is unable to protect itself in the 
political process or that has traditionally faced 
discrimination.296 The Court considers several factors to 
determine when a legislative classification warrants more 
stringent levels of judicial protection: (1) whether the class 
is identified by an immutable characteristic; (2) whether the 
class has a long history of suffering from invidious 
  
 293. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021; see also Local Div. 589, 666 F.2d at 
642 (interpreting United States Trust as not requiring courts to reexamine de 
novo all of the factors underlying legislative judgments). 
 294. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 370­71 (quoting Local Div. 589, 666 
F.2d at 643); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 295. See generally LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16­2 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
 296. In its famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., the 
Court laid the foundation for its modern equal protection jurisprudence, 
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state­sponsored discrimination. 304 U.S. 144, 152­53 n.4 (1938). For this reason, 
the Court suggested that courts should act to protect the interests of such 
minorities by closely scrutinizing state laws and policies. Id. 
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discrimination; and (3) whether the class is relatively 
politically powerless.297 Based on these factors, the Court 
has identified three different levels of review: (1) strict 
scrutiny for governmental action affecting suspect classes; 
(2) intermediate scrutiny with respect to quasi­suspect 
classes; and (3) rational basis review for all other 
governmental classifications.298 
Where a public employer intentionally discriminates on 
the basis of race, or has a statute or policy in place that 
makes a racial classification, the classification is subject to 
strict scrutiny and the state must show that its decision is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.299 In contrast, the “quasi­suspect” classes—those 
classifications based on gender and illegitimacy—are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny, which asks whether a 
public employer’s decision serves “important governmental 
objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.”300 All other classifications—including 
those based on age, disability, sexual orientation, and 
religion—receive rational basis review which asks merely 
whether a challenged policy or practice is reasonably 
related to a valid state interest.301  
A similar sliding scale approach is appropriate with 
respect to contract clause analysis. For the vast majority of 
legislatively­imposed contract impairments, the courts 
generally should defer to the economic and social judgment 
of the legislative body in a manner similar to rational basis 
review. But that broad level of deference is not appropriate 
for circumstances in which the motive of the legislative body 
is suspect, such as when the legislative body is impairing its 
own contractual obligation. In this context, the legislative 
impairment is as likely to represent a convenient avoidance 
of the governmental unit’s own obligation as it is to 
represent a step that is reasonable and necessary to 
safeguard societal interests. In this narrow set of 
  
 297. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686­88 (1973). 
 298. See generally TRIBE, supra note 295, at §§ 16­3 to ­6.  
 299. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985). 
 300. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 301. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
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circumstances, a more searching, less deferential inquiry 
into legislative purpose is warranted. While a requirement 
of strict scrutiny may go too far, a requirement that a 
legislative body must show that a self­impairment is 
reasonable and necessary to serve “important governmental 
objectives” is consistent with United States Trust.  
2. Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Differ from “Real” Contracts. A second analytic flaw 
embraced by some courts is to view public sector collective 
bargaining agreements as less worthy of protection than 
other types of contracts. The decision of the New York Court 
of Appeals in Subway­Surface Supervisors illustrates this 
viewpoint. In that case, the court upheld the rescission of a 
5% wage increase provided for the second year of a two­year 
collective bargaining agreement.302 In doing so, the court 
contrasted the contract rights of the transit workers covered 
by the collective agreement with the contract rights of 
municipal bondholders who previously had been accorded 
preferential treatment by the City.303 The court noted that 
the elimination of the wage increases was merely 
prospective in nature, since the increases had not yet been 
earned and were not vested since the employees had the 
right to quit in response to the legislative modification.304 In 
contrast, the court found the bondholders’ rights to be 
superior since those rights already had vested and the 
impairment of those rights would have had a greater 
detrimental impact by worsening the City’s credit rating.305  
The concept of vesting relied on by the New York court 
in Subway­Surface Supervisors mistakenly views future 
compensation established in a collective bargaining 
agreement through the lens of legislative powers rather 
than as a contractual obligation. Although employee 
compensation in the absence of collective bargaining is 
conferred voluntarily by a governmental employer, and a 
property right arises only upon an employee’s 
  
 302. Subway­Surface Supervisors Ass’n v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 375 N.E.2d 
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performance,306 the introduction of public sector collective 
bargaining changes both the nature and timing of the 
employee’s property interest. That interest is now governed 
by contract and not simply by the unilateral will of the 
governmental entity. As the Supreme Court of California 
explained in Sonoma County Public Employees, a multiple­
year collective bargaining agreement constitutes an 
indivisible contractual whole for which employees render 
consideration from the contract’s inception.307 The New York 
court thus failed to recognize that the contract itself, once 
validly executed and ratified, gives rise to a vested 
obligation for the duration of the contract term.308  
Equally as troubling is the New York court’s view that 
public sector bargaining agreements are less deserving of 
protection than are other types of contracts.309 The court’s 
comparison of the respective rights of public employees and 
municipal bondholders, in addition to its skewed view as to 
vesting, inappropriately transforms public sector collective 
bargaining agreements into second­class contractual 
obligations.  
3.   Extra Loyalty. In a related vein, some courts 
upholding legislative modifications view public employees 
as owing special obligations to their governmental 
employers. The best example of this phenomenon is 
  
 306. See, e.g., Personnel Div. v. St. Clair, 498 P.2d 809, 811 (Or. Ct. App. 
1972). 
 307. See Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 10 
(Cal. 1979). The court stated:  
[W]e seriously question the New York court’s rationale. A contract must 
be viewed as a whole; it cannot be fractured into isolated components. 
The anticipated wage increases during the second year thereof may 
have affected the employees’ wage demands for the first year of the 
contract, and undoubtedly many employees rendered their services in 
the first year in anticipation of their contractual right to the second 
year increase. It is doubtful, therefore, that the New York court was 
correct in its conclusion that the employees had not rendered 
consideration for the second year of the contract when the freeze was 
imposed.  
Id. at 10. 
 308. See Labor Relations Comm’n v. Bd. of Selectmen, 373 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 
(Mass. 1978). 
 309. See Subway­Surface Supervisors, 375 N.E.2d at 390­91. 
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provided in Baltimore Teachers Union, in which the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a furlough plan that 
impaired the provisions of several collective bargaining 
agreements.310 The Fourth Circuit noted that the furlough 
plan “affected reliance interests not wholly unlike those of 
private entities in regulated industries, which contract [is] 
subject to future, additional regulation.”311 The court went 
on to state: “[p]ublic employees—federal or state—by 
definition serve the public and their expectations are 
necessarily defined, at least in part, by the public interest. 
It should not be wholly unexpected, therefore, that these 
public servants might well be called upon to sacrifice first 
when the public interest demands sacrifice.”312 
The notion advanced by the Fourth Circuit is that 
public employees owe a special fealty by virtue of their 
employment such that they may be required to bear a 
greater proportional burden when a governmental entity 
seeks to respond to a fiscal crisis. The court’s comparison of 
the respective rights of public employees and municipal 
bondholders is reminiscent of the paternalistic and largely 
discredited “extra loyalty” doctrine.313 The Fourth Circuit’s 
focus on the appropriateness of public employee sacrifices is 
also inconsistent with the concept of spreading the burden 
of fiscal problems widely among affected groups.314 
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit’s approach provides a 
disquieting justification for treating public employees, like 
their contracts, as second­class citizens.315  
  
 310. Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993); 
see also notes 209­23 and accompanying text. 
 311. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021. 
 312. Id.  
 313. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 279­81 and accompanying text; see also Lee, supra note 
268, at 1653 (“Equity demands that the whole city, not just its employees, carry 
the burden of the fiscal crisis.”). 
 315. See Alan Miles Ruben, The Top Ten Judicial Decisions Affecting Labor 
Relations in Public Education During the Decade of the 1990’s: The Verdict of 
Quiescent Years, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 247, 250 (2001) (“The Fourth Circuit’s decision 
illustrates, once again, that when times are tough and government coffers 
depleted, the assumed security of public school employment may be illusory, and 
lends credence to the cynical notion that public employees are second class 
citizens whose interests can be sacrificed for political considerations.”); see also 
 
52 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59  
C.  A Suggested Framework  
The preceding discussion of significant factual issues 
and analytic shortcomings begs one final question: What 
should be the appropriate analytic framework for resolving 
contract clause challenges to legislative modifications of 
collective bargaining agreements? After sifting through 
these various considerations, the following four­factor 
framework is recommended. 
 1. Heightened Scrutiny. As the Supreme Court stated 
in United States Trust, “complete deference to a legislative 
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not 
appropriate [where] the State’s self­interest is at stake.”316 
Because such an impairment occurs in a context where the 
motives of the governmental actor are suspect, something 
more than rational basis judicial review is warranted. An 
appropriate standard is provided by analogy to intermediate 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.317 Thus, in 
reviewing a legislative body’s impairment of a collective 
bargaining agreement, a court should undertake a de novo 
review to determine if the impairment was an action that 
was reasonable and necessary to serve an important 
government purpose.  
2. A Reasonable Response to an Unanticipated 
Emergency. The Supreme Court in United States Trust 
focused on foreseeability as the key to the reasonableness 
inquiry.318 In that case, the Court found that the abrogation 
of a covenant due to financial concerns was not reasonable 
where the likelihood of substantial future deficits was well 
known at the time of the covenant’s adoption.319 Thus, to be 
reasonable, a contract impairment must be in response to 
  
Stephen J. McGarry, Public Sector Collective Bargaining and the Contract 
Clause, 31 LAB. L.J. 67, 73 (1980) (concluding that the New York court’s decision 
in Subway­Surface Supervisors “comes suspiciously close” to the previous notion 
that public employees “owe a duty of ‘extra loyalty’ which no other group owes to 
the state”).  
 316. U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977). 
 317. See supra pp. 47­48. 
 318. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 31­32. 
 319. See id. 
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an emergency that was unforeseable at the time the 
contractual obligation was incurred, or where a foreseeable 
problem morphs into an emergency that is different in kind 
and not just degree.320 Finally, a reasonable impairment is 
one that is rationally and minimally tailored to address the 
problem at issue.321    
3. Modification Found Necessary After a Full 
Exploration of Alternatives. In United States Trust, the 
Supreme Court stated that “a State is not completely free to 
consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a 
par with other policy alternatives.”322 At a minimum, this 
language means that a governmental body, in order to 
justify impairing one of its own contractual obligations, 
must demonstrate that it first considered other alternatives 
in good faith. It also means that such an impairment will 
not be allowed under the contract clause unless the 
governmental body that implemented the impairment had 
reasonable grounds for failing to resort to other 
alternatives.   
4.  A Program of Shared Pain. As a corollary to the 
third factor, courts generally should not uphold a 
governmental entity’s modification of one of its own 
contracts unless it is part of a plan that distributes the 
burden of coping with fiscal crisis broadly and equitably.323 
This requirement serves three related purposes. First, such 
a plan is evidence that the governmental entity considered 
the various alternatives to contract abrogation. Second, the 
development of such a plan serves to undercut the suspicion 
that a public entity’s impairment of one of its own contracts 
is self­serving in nature. Finally, the plan may serve to 
demonstrate that the impairment is reasonable and 
  
 320. See Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 713 
(Mass. 1995). 
 321. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 371­72 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding legislative modification where impairment was temporary and 
prospective in nature). 
 322. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30­31. 
 323. See supra notes 279­81 and accompanying text. 
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necessary as a “last resort” means of dealing with a fiscal 
emergency.324  
This framework faithfully implements the standards 
and policies of the United States Trust decision. Pursuant to 
this approach, governmental entities generally should not 
be able to renege on their own agreements—whether 
established by collective bargaining or otherwise—as a 
matter of economic expedience. Instead, courts should 
carefully review self­serving abrogations to determine if 
they truly are reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important government purpose. The Supreme Court’s 
United States Trust decision, however, also recognized the 
need for a safety valve in the public interest.325 Thus, when 
a governmental entity—such as the Buffalo Fiscal Authority 
in Buffalo Teachers Federation—responds to an 
unanticipated financial emergency by a broad plan of 
shared pain that includes the impairment of a collectively 
bargained wage increase, the impairment may be upheld as 
a necessary and lawful component of that plan.326  
CONCLUSION  
As public sector budgets have waxed and waned in 
response to changes in the economic cycle, public sector 
managers over the past thirty years have repeatedly faced 
periods of fiscal crisis. With personnel costs constituting a 
major component of these budgets, public sector employers 
increasingly have sought to control costs by resorting to 
measures such as wage freezes and furloughs.327 
The prerogative of governmental entities to set 
compensation and hours, however, becomes more limited 
when such terms and conditions of employment are 
governed by collective bargaining agreements. A system of 
collective bargaining transforms such topics from matters of 
  
 324. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371 (finding wage freeze to be a 
necessary “last resort” after other budgetary measures failed to resolve the City 
of Buffalo’s fiscal crisis). 
 325. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25 (“[A]n impairment may be 
constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public 
purpose.”). 
 326. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371­72. 
 327. See supra notes 54­58 and accompanying text. 
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unilateral employer authority to matters subject to bilateral 
determination. In the latter context, an employer’s 
unilateral alteration of contract terms without bargaining is 
unlawful. This is a core principle of both private and public 
sector labor relations. 
A significant point of departure for the two sectors 
occurs when a legislative body, such as a state legislature, 
enacts legislation that has the effect of modifying the terms 
of a public sector collective bargaining agreement. If the 
legislative body is not the statutory “employer” of the 
employees covered by that agreement, this exercise of the 
legislature’s lawmaking authority is limited only by the 
terms of the federal and state constitutions, with the 
contract clause of the United States Constitution serving as 
the principal limitation.328  
As discussed in this Article, numerous court decisions 
have considered the reach of the contract clause in this 
setting over the past thirty years. Most of these courts have 
properly applied the principles established by the Supreme 
Court in United States Trust to restrict the permissible 
scope of such arguably self­serving legislative modifications. 
A significant minority of decisions, however, have afforded 
substantial deference to such modifications even though 
they occur in a context in which the legislative body is 
hardly a disinterested observer.  
While the legislative impairment of governmental 
contract rights is a necessary safety valve in some 
circumstances, an underlying theme of many of the minority 
decisions is that public sector collective bargaining 
agreements are not as worthy of protection as other types of 
contracts entered into by government entities. This Article 
takes issue with that theme as an undesirable vestige of the 
discredited notion that public employees owe a duty of 
“extra loyalty” to the state. Public sector collective 
bargaining agreements should not be treated as a second­ 
class type of contract. A legislative body, accordingly, should 
be sustained in impairing its contract obligations to its 
employees on the same basis as other self­serving 
impairments; that is, only when such impairment is 
reasonable and necessary to serve an important government 
purpose.  
  
 328. See supra notes 112­13 and accompanying text. 
